TAG Bulletin: Q3 2025 – Industry Updates & Insights

Google’s Ongoing Efforts ​to Combat Coordinated Influence Operations: ⁤A Deep Dive into Recent Findings (December ​2023)

Google is committed to safeguarding the ‌integrity of its platforms against coordinated influence operations – deliberate efforts to manipulate public opinion in a strategic and deceptive ​manner. This report details recent ⁢actions taken by Google to identify and dismantle such‍ networks, demonstrating our ongoing investment in protecting users and upholding the quality of details available across our services, including YouTube, Google News, and Discover. These actions are informed by years ⁢of experience analyzing online manipulation tactics and a ‍deep understanding of the evolving threat landscape. This commitment is central​ to our mission of organizing the world’s information and making it universally accessible and‌ useful.

Understanding the Threat: Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior

Coordinated influence operations,often referred to as “coordinated inauthentic behavior,” differ from simple expression of opinion. They involve deceptive practices, including the use of fake ‌accounts, coordinated content amplification, and misrepresentation of affiliation. ⁢These campaigns aim to distort public discourse, sow discord, and possibly ‌interfere in political processes. Google’s Threat intelligence ​teams employ a combination ⁤of machine⁣ learning, human analysis,⁣ and collaboration with external⁢ experts to detect and attribute these activities. our approach focuses on identifying patterns of behavior, not the content itself, ensuring we protect legitimate expression while mitigating harmful ⁤manipulation.

Recent Actions & Key Findings (Q4 2023)

Between October and December 2023, Google terminated numerous channels and blocked domains across multiple platforms as part of ongoing ‍investigations. The following summarizes key findings, categorized by the identified actor and the focus of thier campaigns:

1. Russia-Linked Operations:​ A persistent threat

Russia continues to be a primary source of coordinated influence operations. Our investigations revealed multiple campaigns targeting various regions and narratives:

* Ukraine ⁤& Western Criticism: We terminated a notable number‍ of ⁣YouTube⁢ channels -​ 3,269 linked to a Russian consulting firm – sharing content in Russian critical of Ukraine and ‌the West. This campaign represents one of the ⁢largest ‌takedowns to⁢ date, highlighting the scale of Russian efforts to⁤ shape international perceptions. Further actions included terminating 5 YouTube ‍channels and‌ blocking 3 domains sharing ‌similar content ​in English and Russian (6 total actions).
* Moldovan Government Disinformation: ⁢ multiple campaigns targeted Moldova, sharing content in Russian‍ and Romanian critical‍ of the moldovan government and supportive of Russia. We terminated 118 YouTube ​channels, 1 ​ Ads account, and 5 YouTube channels ⁢& 1 Ads account (total of 124 actions) related​ to this effort. This demonstrates a focused attempt to‌ destabilize a‍ neighboring country.
* Western Criticism (Portuguese): We blocked 1 ​domain from appearing on google News and⁢ Discover due to the dissemination of content in Portuguese ⁢supportive of Russia and critical of the West.

2. Iran-Linked Operations:​ Expanding Regional Focus

Iranian-linked operations are increasingly diversifying their targets ⁤and tactics:

* Support for Iranian Government (Arabic): We terminated 15 ‍YouTube channels sharing content in Arabic supportive of the Iranian government.
* Targeting azerbaijan (Azerbaijani): We terminated 27 ⁢ YouTube channels sharing content in Azerbaijani critical of Azerbaijan, suggesting an attempt to sow internal dissent.

3. China-Linked Operations: Consistent Narrative Control

Our ongoing examination into coordinated influence operations linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) ⁤resulted in the termination of 6,484 YouTube channels. This network uploaded content in Chinese and English focusing on ​China and US foreign affairs, consistent with previously identified‌ patterns of PRC-backed information manipulation. This demonstrates a sustained effort to shape the global narrative surrounding China.

4. Azerbaijan-Linked ⁤Operations: Domestic & Regional Influence

We identified two campaigns linked to Azerbaijan:

* Support for⁢ azerbaijan & Criticism of Armenia: We terminated 1,119 YouTube channels sharing content in Azerbaijani supportive of​ Azerbaijan and critical of Armenia and critics‍ of the azerbaijani government.
* Targeting Domestic Critics: This highlights a dual strategy of promoting a favorable ⁣national image while suppressing dissenting voices.

5. indonesia-Linked ⁤Operations: Domestic Political Manipulation

Indonesia saw a surge​ in coordinated ⁣influence operations focused on domestic politics:

* Support for Indonesian Government (bahasa): We terminated 445 YouTube channels sharing‌ content in ⁤bahasa supportive of the Indonesian government.
* Support for Indonesian Political Figures (Indonesian): We terminated 27 ‍YouTube channels promoting specific Indonesian political figures.
* Criticism of West Java Government (Indonesian): We terminated 17 YouTube⁤ channels critical of the West Java government.

6. Other Notable Campaigns:

* Cambodia/Thailand (Khmer & English): We terminated 66 YouTube‌ channels ‍sharing content supportive of Cambodia and critical of Thailand.
* Chile (Spanish): We terminated‍ 63 YouTube channels supporting a chilean political party