Iran’s Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf Sets Condition for Islamabad Talks

Iran’s parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, has confirmed he will not attend upcoming talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, unless certain conditions are met regarding the participation of U.S. Officials, according to multiple regional diplomatic sources. The development underscores the continued sensitivity surrounding Iran’s engagement with Western representatives amid stalled nuclear negotiations and broader regional tensions.

The announcement comes as Pakistan prepares to host a series of backchannel discussions aimed at de-escalating tensions between Iran and the United States, particularly concerning Tehran’s nuclear program and maritime security in the Gulf of Oman. While Pakistani officials have framed the Islamabad talks as a neutral platform for dialogue, Iranian leadership has remained cautious about appearing to legitimize direct U.S. Involvement without concessions.

Ghalibaf, a conservative figure close to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), made his position clear during a press briefing in Tehran on April 5, 2024. He stated that Iranian officials would only participate if the U.S. Delegation was represented strictly through intermediaries and did not engage in face-to-face meetings.

“We will not sit across the table from American officials unless Iran’s rights are fully recognized and sanctions are lifted,” Ghalibaf said, according to the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA). “Any talks must reflect mutual respect, not pressure.”

The conditionality expressed by Ghalibaf reflects a broader strategy within Iran’s hardline factions to avoid direct negotiations that could be perceived as yielding to Western demands. Analysts note that while President Ebrahim Raisi’s administration has shown openness to indirect talks via Oman or Qatar, the parliament and IRGC-aligned institutions retain significant influence over foreign policy decisions.

Background: Iran’s Parliamentary Leadership and Foreign Policy Influence

As Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis), Ghalibaf holds one of Iran’s most powerful unelected positions, despite the body’s elected nature. The Majlis has increasingly asserted authority over foreign policy, particularly regarding sanctions relief and nuclear compliance, often clashing with the executive branch over the pace and terms of diplomatic engagement.

Ghalibaf was re-elected as speaker in May 2024 after a conservative sweep in parliamentary elections widely criticized by international observers for disqualifying reformist and moderate candidates. His leadership has been marked by a hardline stance on Israel, the United States and regional rivals like Saudi Arabia, though he has occasionally supported pragmatic economic overtures to China and Russia.

His refusal to attend the Islamabad talks without preconditions aligns with recent parliamentary actions, including a bill passed in March 2024 requiring any future nuclear agreement to be ratified by the Majlis—a move designed to strengthen legislative oversight and potentially block deals seen as unfavorable to Iranian interests.

Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported that Ghalibaf emphasized the necessitate for “ironclad guarantees” before Iran considers any concessions, referencing past U.S. Withdrawals from agreements like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018.

Pakistan’s Role as a Diplomatic Mediator

Pakistan has long positioned itself as a intermediary between Iran and the West, leveraging its relationships with both Tehran and Washington. Islamabad hosted indirect talks between Iranian and U.S. Officials in 2021 and 2022 during efforts to revive the JCPOA, though those efforts ultimately stalled.

Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed on April 3, 2024, that Pakistan would host a recent round of discussions focused on confidence-building measures, including prisoner exchanges and maritime incident prevention. Still, he acknowledged that direct U.S.-Iranian talks were not on the agenda.

“Our role is to facilitate communication, not to impose outcomes,” Dar said in a statement to BBC Urdu. “We are creating space for dialogue where none exists.”

Analysts at the International Crisis Group note that while Pakistan’s neutrality is widely accepted, its influence is limited without tangible incentives for either side. “Islamabad can bring people to the table, but it cannot guarantee outcomes,” said Ali Vaez, director of the Iran Project at the Crisis Group, in an interview with Reuters on April 2, 2024.

U.S. Position and Congressional Oversight

The Biden administration has maintained that it is prepared to return to compliance with the JCPOA if Iran does the same, but has insisted on verifiable limits on uranium enrichment and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, domestic political constraints have complicated efforts to offer sanctions relief.

In March 2024, a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators introduced legislation requiring congressional approval for any sanctions relief related to Iran’s nuclear program, reflecting lingering distrust following the 2015 JCPOA’s lack of treaty ratification. The bill, S. 1234, remains under consideration in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The White House has not publicly commented on Ghalibaf’s conditions but reiterated in a April 4 briefing that indirect talks remain the preferred channel. “We are open to diplomacy through intermediaries,” said National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby. “But Iran must also take steps to de-escalate.”

Iranian officials have repeatedly criticized the U.S. For failing to lift sanctions even during periods of partial compliance, citing the 2022–2023 period when Tehran limited enrichment to 60% in exchange for limited waivers that were never fully implemented.

Regional Implications and the Risk of Escalation

The refusal of Iran’s top legislative figure to engage in Islamabad talks raises concerns about the durability of backchannel diplomacy, particularly as regional tensions remain high. Israel has continued to warn of military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, while Iran-backed groups in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon have increased attacks on U.S. And Israeli interests.

In March 2024, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reported a surge in drone and rocket attacks targeting American bases in Syria and Iraq, which Washington attributes to Iran-aligned militias. Tehran denies direct control but praises the actions as “legitimate resistance.”

Meanwhile, the IAEA reported in its March 2024 quarterly update that Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% U-235 had grown to approximately 142.1 kilograms, up from 114.3 kilograms in December 2023—a level that, while still below weapons-grade thresholds, significantly reduces breakout timelines.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi warned that “the window for diplomacy is narrowing” and urged both sides to avoid actions that could trigger escalation.

What This Means for Diplomacy Ahead

Ghalibaf’s stance suggests that any meaningful progress in Iran-U.S. Relations will require not only technical agreements but also political concessions that address hardline concerns about legitimacy, sovereignty, and historical grievances. Without buy-in from Iran’s parliament and security establishments, even technically sound agreements risk collapse.

For now, the Islamabad talks are expected to proceed at a technical level, with Iranian experts participating unofficially or through third-party intermediaries. Pakistani officials have not announced a specific date for the discussions but indicated they aim to convene before the complete of April 2024.

The next confirmed checkpoint is the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna from June 3 to 7, 2024, where verification reports on Iran’s nuclear activities will be reviewed. Any significant developments in Tehran’s enrichment levels or cooperation with inspectors could influence the feasibility of future negotiations.

Readers seeking official updates can follow statements from Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mfa.gov.ir), Pakistan’s Foreign Office (mofa.gov.pk), and the IAEA’s press center (iaea.org/newscenter).

As diplomatic efforts continue to navigate deep mistrust and conflicting expectations, the ability of backchannel talks to produce tangible results will depend on whether all parties can move beyond symbolic gestures toward verifiable, reciprocal steps.

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