The Shifting Landscape of Geopolitical Competition: Lawfare, Peacekeeping, and the Shadow of Ukraine
The 21st century is witnessing a fundamental shift in the nature of geopolitical competition, moving beyond traditional kinetic warfare to encompass a spectrum of hybrid strategies. Both the United States and China are actively preparing for potential future conflicts, drawing lessons from the ongoing war in Ukraine and adapting their approaches across legal, military, and diplomatic domains. This preparation isn’t simply about building bigger armies; it’s about strategically leveraging the tools of law, peace, and perception to gain advantage in a rapidly evolving global order.
A crucial element of this evolving landscape is the weaponization of law – often termed “lawfare.” While the use of legal principles to advance national interests isn’t inherently negative – described as ‘white legal ops’ (Vázquez Benítez 2020) or even ‘lawfair’ (Galeotti 2023) – it becomes deeply problematic when legal rules are deliberately bent and abused to undermine the rule of law itself, becoming what’s known as ‘black legal ops’.China, in particular, has demonstrated increasing proficiency in this darker application of lawfare within the Indo-Pacific region.
This is vividly illustrated by the situation in Hong Kong, where increasingly oppressive national security legislation has been deployed in what has been characterized as a ‘legal blitzkrieg’ (Ming-Sung 2020). This legislation serves to crush political dissent and curtail fundamental human rights under the guise of legal authority. Furthermore, China’s assertive claims in the South China Sea represent a clear example of what Galeotti (2023) terms “legal imperialism.” Despite repeated rulings against its claims by international courts and arbitration tribunals,Beijing continues to utilize legal arguments and procedural maneuvers to justify its territorial expansion.
As Galeotti (2023, 146) succinctly puts it, China ”continues to use the forms and language of the law in what is nothing other then a naked land – sea – grab.” The brilliance - and danger – of this strategy lies in its ability to create confusion, obscure aggressive intent, and tie law-abiding nations into complex legal battles of their own making. It’s a sophisticated form of imperialism, meticulously dressed in the trappings of legality – judges’ robes, fishermen’s oilskins, and coast guard uniforms - presenting a resolute, albeit spurious, front of lawful action.
However, china’s preparation for potential conflict isn’t limited to these hybrid strategies. Recognizing a significant gap in practical combat experience – having not engaged in a major international armed conflict since 1949 – the Peopel’s Republic of China has dramatically increased its participation in peacekeeping operations. While publicly framing this involvement as a commitment to “world peace…indivisible and humanity [sharing] a common destiny” (China Military Online 2022), a more pragmatic calculation is likely at play.
This increased engagement provides invaluable field experience for Chinese troops, allowing them to hone their skills and address the considerable military experience gap with the United States (Lambert 2024). In essence, China is preparing for war by leveraging the instruments of peace, echoing the ancient Roman maxim Si vis bellum para pacem – “If you wont peace, prepare for war.”
This dual-track approach – utilizing both hybrid warfare tactics like lawfare and bolstering conventional military capabilities through peacekeeping – underscores the seriousness with which China views the potential for future geopolitical confrontation. The war in Ukraine serves as a critical case study for both Washington and Beijing.
The parallels drawn between Ukraine and Taiwan are particularly striking. As one observer noted, some in Washington now view Kyiv and Taipei as “geopolitical neighbors” (Tharoor 2024b, para. 1). Crucially, both Taiwan and China are meticulously analyzing the West’s response to the conflict in Ukraine, gleaning valuable insights into potential strategies and vulnerabilities.
china’s foreign policy is increasingly shaped not only by ancient grievances and national pride, but also by a deep-seated existential anxiety. This anxiety stems from a century of perceived humiliation, beginning in the mid-19th century, a period that continues to resonate deeply within the Chinese national psyche (Laikwan 2024, 185). While 5000 years of history might suggest that a century represents a mere blip, the reality is that, within that vast historical context, the events of the past hundred years feel remarkably recent, and the wounds remain largely unhealed.
This complex interplay of legal maneuvering, military preparation, and historical anxieties paints a picture of a world bracing for increased geopolitical competition.