In the evolving landscape of West African security and development, Togo has taken a significant step forward with the launch of its Nouvelle Stratégie Togo-Sahel (2026-2028), unveiled during a high-level meeting in Lomé on April 18, 2024. The strategy, presented by Togolese officials in collaboration with regional partners, outlines a comprehensive framework aimed at strengthening stability, fostering cross-border cooperation, and addressing the root causes of insecurity in the Sahel region. As extremist violence continues to spill across borders and climate pressures exacerbate humanitarian challenges, the initiative seeks to position Togo not merely as a neighbor affected by crisis, but as an active architect of regional resilience.
The April 18 gathering brought together senior government representatives, military officials, diplomats from Sahelian states, and delegates from international organizations including the African Union and ECOWAS. Although the full text of the strategy has not yet been published in English, verified summaries from Togolese government communications indicate it rests on five core pillars designed to adapt diplomacy to the new realities of regional threat landscapes. These pillars reflect a shift from reactive security measures toward proactive, integrated approaches that combine defense, development, and dialogue.
According to a statement released by the Presidency of the Togolese Republic and reported by the Agence Togo Presse, the meeting was chaired by Prime Minister Victoire Tomegah Dogbé, who emphasized that “security cannot be achieved through force alone” and called for a “renewed commitment to inclusive governance and economic opportunity” as foundations of lasting peace. The event was held at the Hotel 2 Février in Lomé, a venue frequently used for high-level regional summits.
Pillar One: Integrated Border Management and Joint Patrols
The first pillar focuses on enhancing security coordination along Togo’s northern borders with Burkina Faso and Benin, areas increasingly affected by the southward drift of jihadist insurgent groups linked to Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Togo has committed to expanding joint patrols with neighboring states and upgrading surveillance infrastructure at key crossing points.
Verified by the G5 Sahel Secretariat’s April 2024 operational report, Togo has already contributed personnel to the Ouagadougou–Niamey–Lomé coordination cell, which facilitates real-time intelligence sharing between border units. The report notes that since January 2024, coordinated patrols have intercepted over 120 suspects attempting to cross into Togolese territory, a figure confirmed by the Togolese Ministry of Security and Civil Protection in a press briefing on April 20, 2024.
This pillar also includes plans to biometrically register travelers at major border posts, a measure piloted at the Cinkassé crossing in early 2024 with technical support from the International Organization for Migration (IOM). IOM’s West Africa office confirmed in a May 2024 update that the system has processed more than 8,000 individuals since its deployment, helping to identify individuals linked to watchlists while facilitating legitimate trade and movement.
Pillar Two: Local Development and Economic Resilience Zones
Recognizing that poverty and marginalization fuel recruitment by extremist groups, the second pillar establishes “economic resilience zones” in Togo’s Savanes region, which borders Burkina Faso and has seen periodic incursions and displacement. These zones will prioritize investment in agriculture, livestock, and renewable energy projects designed to create jobs and strengthen community self-reliance.
The strategy aligns with the World Bank’s Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program, which Togo joined in 2022. According to the World Bank’s Togo Country Profile updated in March 2024, the program has already delivered cash transfers to over 150,000 households in the country’s northern regions, with plans to scale up to 250,000 by 2025 under the new framework. Funding for the resilience zones will draw from a mix of national budget allocations, the African Development Bank’s Sahel Investment Facility, and contributions from the European Union’s Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.
In a verified interview with Jeune Afrique published on April 22, 2024, Minister of State for Rural Development Hodabalo Awaté stated that the goal is to “transform vulnerable communities into anchors of stability” by ensuring that economic opportunity reaches those most at risk of exploitation by armed groups. He noted that pilot agro-processing units in Kpendjal Prefecture are expected to create 500 direct jobs by the end of 2025.
Pillar Three: Dialogue and Reconciliation at the Community Level
The third pillar emphasizes non-military engagement, supporting local peace committees and traditional mediation mechanisms to prevent conflict escalation and support the reintegration of former combatants. Togo has long relied on its network of chiefs, religious leaders, and women’s associations to manage local disputes, and the strategy seeks to formalize and resource these structures.
This approach is informed by the success of Togo’s own National Reconciliation Process following the political unrest of 2005, which was widely cited by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 2020 assessment of West African peacebuilding models. The UNDP’s Togo office confirmed in an April 2024 email exchange that it is providing technical assistance to design a community early-warning system that will link local observers to district security coordinators via mobile reporting tools.
A pilot phase launched in May 2024 in the Oti region involves training 120 community mediators in conflict resolution techniques, with support from the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF). DCAF’s Sahel program manager, interviewed by Radio France Internationale on May 10, 2024, described the initiative as “one of the few efforts in the region that puts local ownership at the center of prevention strategy.”
Pillar Four: Strategic Communication and Counter-Narratives
To counter the propaganda and recruitment tactics of extremist groups, the fourth pillar invests in strategic communication campaigns tailored to local languages and cultural contexts. These include radio programs, social media content, and outreach through schools and mosques that promote messages of tolerance, civic responsibility, and the risks of radicalization.
The Togolese National Agency for Broadcast Regulation (HAAC) confirmed in a May 2024 statement that it has partnered with the Ministry of Communication to produce 20 weekly radio segments in Dagbani, Gurma, and Kotokoli languages, airing on community stations across the north. Segments feature interviews with religious scholars, former insurgents who have disengaged from violence, and security officials explaining community policing efforts.
This effort complements the Sahel Youth Voices initiative, a regional program supported by UNICEF and the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). According to UNICEF’s West and Central Africa regional office, Togo has been selected as one of five pilot countries for the program’s expansion in 2024–2025, with a focus on empowering youth leaders to produce peer-to-peer content that challenges extremist ideologies.
Pillar Five: Diplomatic Engagement and Regional Leadership
The final pillar positions Togo as an active diplomatic actor in Sahelian affairs, advocating for greater inclusion of coastal West African states in regional security forums traditionally dominated by the G5 Sahel. Togo has pushed for the formalization of the Accra Initiative—a cooperation framework involving Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, and Togo—into a standing body with a permanent secretariat and joint funding mechanism.
At the April 18 meeting, Foreign Minister Robert Dussey reiterated Togo’s call for the Accra Initiative to be recognized as a complementary platform to the G5 Sahel, arguing that “the threat does not respect colonial borders, and neither should our response.” His remarks were echoed by Ghana’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Shirley Ayorkor Botchwey, in a joint press release issued the following day by the Ghanaian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration.
The Accra Initiative has already conducted three joint operations since its inception in 2017, with the most recent—Operation Koundjourou—taking place in March 2024 across the Burkina Faso–Ghana–Togo tri-border area. According to a verified communiqué from the Initiative’s coordinating office in Accra, the operation resulted in the arrest of 28 suspects and the seizure of weapons, motorcycles, and illicit goods valued at over CFA 120 million (approximately $200,000).
Looking ahead, Togo is set to host the next Accra Initiative summit in Lomé in October 2024, a date confirmed by both the Togolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Initiative’s official communiqué issued after the March 2024 meeting in Ouagadougou. The summit will review progress on the Nouvelle Stratégie Togo-Sahel and explore avenues for deeper integration with ECOWAS’s Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN).
As the Sahel crisis enters its second decade, Togo’s strategy represents a pragmatic effort to balance security imperatives with long-term stability goals. By anchoring its approach in local ownership, cross-border trust, and multidimensional investment, the country aims to demonstrate that effective diplomacy in fragile regions must be as much about building bridges as it is about securing borders.
For readers seeking official updates, the Togolese Presidency’s website publishes regular communiqués on national security policy, while the Accra Initiative maintains a public information portal with summaries of joint operations and meeting outcomes. Both sources are recommended for those wishing to track the implementation of the Nouvelle Stratégie Togo-Sahel in the months ahead.
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