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President Donald Trump is increasingly framing United States military involvement as a transactional service, suggesting that foreign nations should directly finance American security operations in exchange for protection. This shift marks a departure from the traditional post-World War II doctrine of maintaining global military presence to secure American strategic interests, moving instead toward a model where the U.S. military functions as a paid, state-backed security provider.
Recent diplomatic and military posturing highlights this pivot. According to reports, the Trump administration has explored a “VIP pass” system for commercial shippers in the Strait of Hormuz, requiring payment for U.S. naval escorts. Furthermore, in discussions regarding regional stability, the President has floated the concept of the U.S. serving as a “guardian” of the Middle East in exchange for a percentage of regional revenues, a proposal that recalibrates the historic security guarantees once provided under the long-standing “Carter Doctrine.”
From Strategic Alliances to Transactional Security
For decades, the United States maintained a massive military footprint in the Persian Gulf primarily to ensure the free flow of oil and to prevent regional hegemony that could threaten American interests. This policy, formalized in 1980 by the Carter Doctrine, established that any attempt to control the Persian Gulf region would be viewed as an assault on vital U.S. national interests. Under that framework, the U.S. provided security as a public good to protect the global economy and its own strategic position.
President Trump’s current rhetoric suggests a fundamental reassessment of this role. In recent weeks, the President has pushed back against the idea of Iran imposing tolls for transit through the Strait of Hormuz, stating that if tolls were to exist, they should be “imposed by and for the United States of America” as reimbursement for services rendered as a “Guardian Angel” to the region. This approach treats U.S. military assets not as tools of national policy, but as billable services.
This “have gun, will travel” model mirrors, in some respects, the security-for-fee arrangements seen elsewhere in global geopolitics, such as the private military contracting models utilized by Russia in Africa. However, applying this to the U.S. military represents a significant shift for a government that has historically relied on a network of formal alliances and binding security commitments to project power.
The destroyer USS Rafael Peralta implements a maritime blockade against an Iranian-flagged ship attempting to sail toward an Iranian port, on April 24, 2026, in the Arabian Sea. | US Central Command/Getty Images
The “Enshittification” of Military Primacy
Political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman have characterized this evolution as the “enshittification of American power,” a term borrowed from tech criticism to describe the degradation of a service as it shifts from providing value to users toward aggressive rent-seeking. As the U.S. pivot toward monetizing its military presence becomes more pronounced, the traditional model—which tied ally security to American protection—is being replaced by a system where Washington aims to “get a cut of the action.”
This transactional strategy faces significant hurdles. Following the conclusion of the recent conflict with Iran, military resources have been reported as depleted, leading the administration to pressure domestic defense contractors to ramp up production. The conflict also demonstrated the limitations of U.S. military power in asymmetric warfare, where regional adversaries can leverage geography and local political dynamics despite U.S. technological superiority.
Moreover, the reliance on private sector technology has introduced new vulnerabilities. During the Iran conflict, the U.S. military faced operational challenges related to the pricing and availability of private satellite connectivity, echoing concerns about how state actors become “locked in” to private military platforms. When commercial providers have the ability to throttle or restrict services—as seen in previous instances involving Starlink—the U.S. military’s capacity to act as a reliable, independent “guardian” is complicated by its dependence on private corporate infrastructure.
Market Realities and Regional Alliances
The success of a “force for hire” model depends on the existence of willing customers, yet the current geopolitical landscape suggests a move in the opposite direction. Gulf nations, wary of the risks associated with a volatile security umbrella, have been exploring regional security frameworks that exclude the United States. The perceived instability following the Iran war, coupled with the continued presence of Iranian ballistic missile capabilities, has led some regional capitals to reconsider their reliance on Washington.
The President’s recent embrace of what some describe as “mowing the grass”—a strategy of periodic, limited strikes to degrade an adversary’s capabilities rather than seeking a decisive, long-term victory—reflects the administration’s pivot toward short-term management of threats. While this may reduce the duration of major deployments, it creates a “landscaping” role for the U.S. military rather than one of a stable, long-term security guarantor.
As of late June 2026, the status of the Strait of Hormuz remains a central point of tension. Following Iran’s announcement on June 20 regarding the reclosure of the strait, the international shipping community is awaiting official guidance on transit safety and the potential for a new regional security arrangement. Further updates regarding U.S. naval posture in the region are expected from the Pentagon in the coming weeks.
Readers interested in official updates on maritime security can monitor the U.S. Central Command for the latest briefings on regional operations and naval deployments.