Beyond containment: Re-Establishing Linkage as a Deterrent in the Indo-Pacific
The current geopolitical landscape, marked by overlapping crises in Ukraine, the taiwan Strait, and the Korean Peninsula, demands a re-evaluation of customary deterrence strategies. While containment has been a cornerstone of Western policy, the increasingly interconnected nature of global security – and the willingness of actors like Russia and North Korea to exploit existing fissures – necessitates a return to a more robust approach: linkage. This isn’t simply a nostalgic revisiting of Cold War tactics, but a pragmatic adaptation to the realities of 21st-century systemic rivalry, particularly within the Indo-Pacific region.
For too long, the tendency has been to compartmentalize crises, treating events in ukraine as distinct from those unfolding in East Asia. Though, the burgeoning partnership between Russia and North Korea – specifically, Russia’s reliance on North Korean military hardware - demonstrates the fallacy of this approach. The assumption that regional actions can be divorced from broader strategic considerations is demonstrably false,and attempting to do so weakens our collective response. We must recognize that miscalculations in one domain can rapidly cascade, creating instability across the entire system.
So, how do we effectively re-establish linkage? It requires a multi-faceted strategy, spearheaded by the United States, Japan, and South Korea, built on concrete mechanisms and binding commitments. Here are several key steps:
1. A Euro-indo-Pacific Sanctions Compact: The most immediate priority is to address the Russia-North Korea arms trade. If Russia continues to procure military supplies from Pyongyang,a coordinated response is crucial. This means NATO members reinforcing sanctions already in place in Europe, while the US, Japan, and South Korea simultaneously expand maritime inspections targeting North Korean vessels and rigorously enforce existing sanctions.This echoes the cold War logic that Soviet aggression anywhere impacted the prospects for global détente – a principle that remains profoundly relevant today.
2. Institutionalizing a Semiconductor Contingency Protocol: The vulnerability of the global semiconductor supply chain is a critical pressure point. To deter further coercion in the Taiwan Strait or the East China Sea, a pre-defined protocol should be established to automatically suspend exports of advanced chips to Chinese firms in the event of aggressive actions. This isn’t a novel idea; it builds upon Japan’s 2023 export restrictions on chipmaking equipment and the US-led Chip 4 Alliance, which includes South Korea. By explicitly linking technological access to maritime security, we prevent Beijing from pursuing a strategy of separating economic benefits from aggressive behavior. This sends a clear signal: escalation will have tangible economic consequences.
3. An Energy Security Linkage mechanism: The Japan-ROK LNG Swap: Energy security is another vital component. Japan’s proactive support of Europe by providing LNG following the invasion of Ukraine demonstrates a willingness to act in solidarity. This spirit of cooperation should be formalized through a Japan-ROK LNG swap, guaranteeing mutual support in a crisis.In return, South Korea should fully adhere to sanctions against Moscow and commit to avoiding any energy policies that undermine the G7 oil price cap. transforming ad hoc responses into binding commitments strengthens collective resilience and demonstrates a unified front.
4. Conditioning Aid on Comprehensive Compliance: The North Korea Test Case: The partnership between Russia and North Korea presents the ideal prospect to test the effectiveness of linkage. Humanitarian aid to Pyongyang should be explicitly conditioned – and rigorously verified – on both nuclear restraint and a complete cessation of arms transfers to Moscow. This verification can be achieved through the UN expert panel and coordinated maritime patrols in the Yellow Sea conducted by the US, Japan, and South Korea. This makes it clear to North Korea that its access to essential resources is contingent upon its commitment to regional stability.
The Lessons of the Cold War - and Why They Still Matter
It’s crucial to acknowledge that linkage policy during the cold war wasn’t without its flaws. Soviet interventions in Angola and Afghanistan proved difficult to prevent, and adversaries inevitably sought to exploit the system. However, the fundamental principle remains sound: in a systemic rivalry, lasting peace and stability require comprehensive bargaining and demonstrable repercussions across multiple domains.
The current environment demands a more sophisticated application of this principle. We must move beyond reactive measures and establish proactive mechanisms that deter aggression before it occurs. The overlapping crises in Ukraine, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula underscore the urgency of this task.
By adapting linkage to the realities of the 21st century – through a robust sanctions compact, a semiconductor protocol, an energy security linkage, and strengthened trilateral cooperation – the US, Japan, and South korea can
