EU Increases Russian Gas Imports Amid Middle East Crisis Supply Shortages

Eastern Europe is currently navigating a precarious energy transition as the region prepares for the potential cessation of Russian gas supplies. The geopolitical landscape has shifted dramatically over the last few years, with the European Union significantly reducing its reliance on Moscow’s energy exports, though certain member states remain tethered to these pipelines due to geographical and political constraints.

The urgency of the situation has intensified as Ukraine moves to block the transit of Russian gas through its territory. Kyiv has explicitly stated that it will not extend the gas transit agreement, which is set to expire on December 31, unless Russia ceases its invasion of Ukraine. This move aims to prevent Moscow from generating further billions in revenue from transit fees while continuing its military campaign.

The scale of the shift in energy dependency is stark. In 2021, just one year before the start of the invasion, Russian gas accounted for more than 40 percent of the European Union’s gas imports. By 2023, that figure had plummeted to less than 10 percent according to reports on EU import data.

Despite this broader trend, the impact of a total transit shutdown would be felt most acutely in Eastern Europe. Countries such as Slovakia, Moldova, and parts of Hungary continue to rely on these flows, creating a complex diplomatic and economic challenge for the EU and NATO as they balance energy security with geopolitical alignment.

The Ukrainian Transit Deadline and Geopolitical Stakes

The current tension centers on a five-year contract signed in 2019 between the Ukrainian energy company Naftogaz, the pipeline operator GTSOU, and the Russian giant Gazprom. As this agreement nears its complete, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has emphasized that Kyiv will not allow Moscow to “earn additional billions from our blood.”

The transit route through Ukraine remains a critical artery for Russian energy. In 2023, official data indicates that 14.65 billion cubic meters of gas were transported via this route, representing slightly less than half of all Russian gas supplied to Europe based on reported transit figures.

The impending block on these supplies is expected to hit Slovakia and Moldova most directly, while Hungary’s exposure is partial. The reaction among these nations varies: Slovakia has shown resistance to the disruption, Moldova has expressed concern, and Hungary has remained relatively calm in the face of the potential cutoff.

Russia’s Remaining Infrastructure and Alternative Routes

Russia currently utilizes two primary methods to deliver gas to the European market, though both have faced significant disruptions or strategic shifts. The most notable failure was the 2022 series of underwater explosions that damaged the Nord Stream pipeline, which previously delivered gas through the Baltic Sea to Northern Germany.

With Nord Stream defunct, Russia relies heavily on the TurkStream pipeline, which runs along the bottom of the Black Sea. This infrastructure, along with its land-based extension known as the Balkan Stream, continues to supply gas to Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary.

The divergence in how EU nations handle these supplies is evident in the case of Austria. After purchasing 90 percent of its gas from Russia during the previous summer, Austria took the decisive step in December to terminate its contract with Gazprom, ending six decades of supply from the Russian provider.

Comparison of Gas Transit Routes

Economic Implications for Eastern Europe

The continued dependency of some Eastern European nations on Russian gas is attributed to a combination of geographical limitations and political ties. While the EU has worked to diversify its energy portfolio, the infrastructure required to replace Russian pipeline gas—such as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals—takes years to implement and requires significant capital investment.

For nations like Slovakia and Hungary, the transition is not merely technical but political. Both are members of the EU and NATO, yet they have maintained closer ties with the Kremlin than many of their Western counterparts, complicating the collective effort to decouple from Russian energy.

The shift from 40 percent dependency in 2021 to under 10 percent in 2023 demonstrates a rapid adaptation by the EU, but the “last mile” of this transition—removing the final dependencies in Eastern Europe—remains the most volatile phase. The risk of supply shortages during winter months continues to drive the urgency for alternative sourcing.

The next critical checkpoint for the region is December 31, the date the current transit agreement expires. Whether a new agreement is reached or the transit is blocked will determine the immediate energy security outlook for several Eastern European states.

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