Navigating the New Conventional Missile Landscape: Deterrence and Stability in Europe
The war in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped the security calculus in Europe, particularly regarding missile capabilities. A growing conventional missile arsenal within NATO is becoming increasingly likely, but its implementation demands careful consideration to avoid escalating tensions with Russia. This analysis explores the rationale behind this buildup, the challenges it presents, and the path forward for maintaining stability.
The Inevitable Buildup & The Need for Clear Signaling
A strategy of simply denying Russia’s missile capabilities is demonstrably failing. Therefore, European NATO members are realistically looking at bolstering thier own conventional missile forces. though, this isn’t about preparing for a preemptive strike.
Clear interaction is paramount. European nations must explicitly link acquisitions to a defensive posture, emphasizing NATO’s lack of offensive intent while simultaneously signaling a resolute commitment to respond decisively – and with overwhelming conventional force – to any Russian missile aggression, whether limited or large-scale. This aims to negate any perceived advantage Russia might gain from missile use.
Distinguishing Conventional from Nuclear – A Critical Imperative
Maintaining a clear distinction between conventional and nuclear missile systems is vital. Most of these new systems will likely be deployed by non-nuclear NATO members like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Poland, and Romania. This clarity is crucial to avoid miscalculation and escalation.
Furthermore, increasing conventional missile stockpiles doesn’t automatically necessitate a parallel increase in nuclear warheads. Integrating new warheads into some delivery systems – particularly smaller cruise missiles or long-range drones - is technically challenging and potentially unsuitable.
The Erosion of Crisis Stability
Despite these considerations, a considerable missile buildup isn’t inherently stabilizing. We are entering a new era of conventional missile warfare, where the proliferation of long-range strike weapons fundamentally undermines crisis stability. This is a broader trend with significant implications for international security.
Why Arms Control is Currently Unrealistic
A tempting solution might seem to be a new arms control agreement limiting conventional missile arsenals between NATO and Russia. However, this is unlikely to succeed. Russia’s history of treaty violations – most notably its blatant disregard for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty – casts serious doubt on its willingness to negotiate in good faith.
Without essential changes in the security environment and within Russia itself, pursuing arms control with Moscow is, sadly, a dead end.
Deterrence through Punishment: The Best Available Option
Given the limitations of denial and arms control, a “punishment” rather than “denial” deterrence posture appears to be the most viable path.this means focusing on the ability to inflict unacceptable costs on Russia after an attack, rather than attempting to prevent the attack altogether.
This approach,while not without risks,can dissuade Russia from aggression against NATO. Crucially, it also serves to deter escalation – specifically, attacks on civilian infrastructure and populations – shoudl conflict erupt, preventing a repeat of the atrocities witnessed in Ukraine.
About the Author
Fabian Hoffmann is a doctoral research fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project of the University of Oslo and a non-resident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington D.C. His expertise lies in missile technology, nuclear strategy, and European deterrence. He regularly publishes his insights in academic journals, reports, and magazines, and can be found sharing timely analysis on his blog, Missile Matters.
