A woman from Woodland Hills, California, was arrested at Los Angeles International Airport in April 2024 on suspicion of violating U.S. Export control laws by allegedly assisting in the transfer of weapons components from Iran to Sudan. Federal authorities say the investigation centers on whether the individual facilitated the illegal shipment of defense-related items subject to strict U.S. Sanctions against both Iran, and Sudan.
The arrest, confirmed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California, occurred on April 10, 2024, when the woman was detained upon arrival at LAX from an international flight. She was taken into custody without incident and later appeared in federal court in Los Angeles, where she was charged with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018.
According to the indictment unsealed in the Central District of California, the woman is accused of acting as an intermediary in a network that sought to procure and transfer military-grade components, including drone parts and navigation systems, from Iranian entities to recipients in Sudan. The alleged scheme involved the use of front companies and false documentation to obscure the true destination of the goods, which are subject to comprehensive U.S. Sanctions due to Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and Sudan’s ongoing placement on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list.
U.S. Officials say the investigation, led by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) with support from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), began in 2022 after customs officials flagged suspicious shipments passing through Los Angeles ports. The case highlights ongoing U.S. Efforts to enforce export controls amid rising concerns about illicit arms flows to conflict zones, particularly in Africa and the Middle East.
The woman, identified in court documents as a 42-year-old naturalized U.S. Citizen born in Iran, has not entered a plea. She remains detained pending a detention hearing, with prosecutors arguing she poses a flight risk and potential danger to the community due to the nature of the alleged offenses and her international connections.
If convicted, she faces up to 20 years in prison for each count of conspiracy to violate IEEPA, along with substantial fines and potential deportation. The case underscores the U.S. Government’s heightened scrutiny of dual-use technology transfers and its commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons that could fuel regional instability.
Understanding the Charges: Export Controls and Sanctions Evasion
The core of the prosecution rests on allegations that the defendant violated two key pillars of U.S. National security law: the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. IEEPA grants the president broad authority to regulate international commerce during declared national emergencies, including blocking transactions with foreign adversaries. Sudan and Iran are both subject to comprehensive sanctions under multiple executive orders, making virtually any transfer of defense-related items illegal without explicit licensing from the Bureau of Industry and Security.
The Export Control Reform Act, which updated and strengthened the former Arms Export Control Act, places strict controls on the export of dual-use items — goods that have both civilian and military applications. These include certain sensors, avionics, and software used in unmanned aerial systems. Violations can occur not only through direct shipment but likewise through intermediation, false documentation, or transshipment via third countries to evade detection.
In this case, prosecutors allege the woman used her personal and professional networks to identify suppliers in Iran, arranged for the purchase of components through intermediaries, and coordinated their movement through third-party countries before attempting to route them to Sudan. The indictment specifically references the use of misleading end-user certificates and the concealment of the ultimate destination on shipping documents — tactics commonly associated with sanctions evasion schemes.
Legal experts note that proving such cases requires demonstrating not only that the goods were controlled but that the defendant knew or should have known the transaction violated U.S. Law. The indictment includes allegations of encrypted communications, coded language in emails, and financial transactions structured to avoid reporting thresholds — all cited as evidence of intent.
Broader Context: U.S. Enforcement of Arms Embargoes in Africa and the Middle East
This arrest occurs amid heightened U.S. Vigilance over arms flows to Sudan, where a brutal civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has caused widespread devastation since April 2023. The conflict has led to one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with over 8 million people displaced and credible reports of war crimes and ethnic cleansing by both sides.
The United States, along with the United Nations and African Union, has maintained an arms embargo on Sudan since 2005, though enforcement has been inconsistent. In 2023, the Biden administration renewed sanctions on individuals and entities implicated in fueling the war, including leaders of both the SAF and RSF. Despite these measures, illicit arms continue to enter the country through porous borders and complex smuggling networks, often involving intermediaries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
Iran, meanwhile, remains under extensive U.S. Sanctions for its nuclear program, ballistic missile development, and support for regional proxy groups. While direct arms exports from Iran to Sudan are not commonly documented, U.S. Intelligence has long monitored Iranian efforts to expand influence in Africa through economic and military channels, including potential support to armed factions in Sudan.
The case reflects a broader trend in which U.S. Authorities are increasingly targeting individuals who act as enablers in illicit supply chains — not just the end recipients or foreign governments, but the facilitators who use legitimate businesses, financial systems, and travel networks to obscure illegal activity. Similar prosecutions have occurred in recent years involving attempts to send electronics to Russia, avionics to Venezuela, and drone parts to Yemen.
What Happens Next in the Legal Process
The defendant is scheduled to appear for a detention hearing on April 24, 2024, before Magistrate Judge Lucy Koh in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. At that hearing, prosecutors will argue for continued detention, citing the severity of the charges, the defendant’s ties to Iran, and the risk she may flee or continue to obstruct justice if released.
If detained, she will remain in federal custody while the case proceeds through pretrial motions, discovery, and potentially a trial. The government has indicated it may seek to introduce evidence of similar past conduct, including alleged attempts to transfer restricted items to other sanctioned countries, though any such evidence would need to be ruled admissible by the court.
The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Joseph Gaeta and Sarah N. Flynn from the National Security Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The defense has not yet entered a public appearance, though federal public defenders are typically assigned in such cases unless private counsel is retained.
Members of the public can access publicly available court documents through the PACER system or by visiting the clerk’s office at the U.S. Courthouse in Los Angeles. The case number is 2:24-cr-00187-PSG. All filings, including the indictment and detention memorandum, are available for review unless sealed for national security reasons.
As of now, no trial date has been set. The next major procedural step will be the detention hearing, after which the court will determine whether the defendant remains in custody pending further proceedings.
This case serves as a reminder of the far-reaching reach of U.S. Export control laws and the serious consequences faced by those accused of undermining them. For individuals engaged in international trade, especially involving dual-use goods, compliance with licensing requirements and end-use verification is not merely advisable — We see a legal obligation with significant criminal penalties for violation.
We encourage readers to stay informed about developments in this case and to share thoughtful, respectful comments below. If you have information related to export control violations, you may report it anonymously to Homeland Security Investigations via their tip line or online portal.