A senior government surveyor has admitted to alerting renovation consultants before conducting site inspections at Wang Fuk Court, a revelation that has cast a spotlight on systemic oversight failures prior to the estate’s fatal blaze. During a public inquiry, the official acknowledged that the very unit tasked with independent verification frequently gave advance warning to the parties it was supposed to be monitoring.
The testimony, delivered before an independent committee, suggests a culture of “self-regulation” within the Housing Bureau’s Independent Checking Unit (ICU). Rather than conducting surprise audits to ensure safety compliance, the unit often coordinated its visits with the consultancy firm overseeing the large-scale maintenance perform, effectively neutralizing the “independent” nature of the checks.
This admission comes as the probe delves into the specific materials that contributed to the spread of the fire. Evidence presented to the committee indicates that non-compliant scaffolding nets and the unauthorized use of foam boards on windows may have accelerated the disaster, while the government’s primary oversight mechanism remained largely passive.
The inquiry is now examining whether this lack of rigorous enforcement created a permissive environment where safety shortcuts became the norm, leaving residents of the Tai Po housing estate vulnerable to a preventable catastrophe.
The Illusion of Oversight: “Self-Regulating” Inspections
Victor Dawes, the lead counsel to the independent committee, questioned Andy Ku, a senior maintenance surveyor at the ICU, regarding the unit’s role in verifying the integrity of consultants. The line of questioning revealed a startling gap in government accountability. When pressed on who was responsible for keeping the consultants in check, Ku described the oversight system as essentially “self-regulating,” admitting that the ICU lacks a formal auditing system.
The committee was informed that for a significant majority of inspections, the ICU notified an employee of Will Power Architects—the consultancy firm managing the maintenance—who served as a representative for the Registered Inspector (RI). In many instances, the actual Registered Inspector was not even present during the ICU’s checks.
This practice deviates sharply from the protocols used by other government bodies, such as the Labour Department and the Buildings Department, which typically employ unannounced visits to capture an accurate snapshot of site safety. According to testimony, out of 10 total inspections conducted at Wang Fuk Court, only two were held without advance notice.
One of those two “surprise” visits was not a planned audit but an impromptu check conducted by Ku himself as he happened to have a medical appointment in the same district. When Dawes asked if the inspection would have occurred had the medical appointment not been scheduled in Tai Po, Ku agreed that it would not have.
Further evidence of this coordination was presented via screenshots of text messages between ICU maintenance surveyor Amanda Lau and the RI representative. These messages showed the scheduling of inspections, which then allowed the representative to alert the contractor, Prestige Construction & Engineering, before officials arrived on site. Ku confirmed that Lau was acting under his direct orders.
Following the fatal fire, the ICU shifted its policy to conduct inspections without advance notice. When asked if this change implied the unit had recognized flaws in its previous approach, Ku conceded that “there was room for improvement.”
Fire Retardancy Failures and “Lied To” Officials
Beyond the timing of inspections, the probe has focused on the materials used during the renovation, specifically scaffolding nets and foam boards, which preliminary investigations suggest contributed to the blaze’s rapid spread. The Buildings Department typically requires strict adherence to fire retardancy standards to prevent the “chimney effect” in high-rise fires, where flames climb the exterior of a building via combustible materials.
The committee questioned Ku on why he informed the Buildings Department that the scaffolding nets at Wang Fuk Court were up to standard, despite the ICU’s own tests showing the nets continued to burn for more than 10 seconds before the flame was extinguished. Ku defended the assessment by stating that upon two subsequent retrials of the same piece of netting, the material did not catch fire.
However, the inquiry revealed a reliance on trust over verification. When asked if the ICU could verify the legitimacy of the fire retardancy certificates provided—and whether those certificates actually corresponded to the specific lot of nets used on site—Ku admitted the unit could not. The ICU simply relied on the contractor’s word.
The issue of foam boards used to cover windows during spalling works added another layer of negligence. Despite complaints from residents, Ku testified that he did not notice the foam boards during a September inspection, claiming that scaffolding nets blocked his view.
A month later, the contractor and inspector informed Ku that foam boards would only be used on three floors at a time to mitigate risk. Based on this assurance, Ku decided there was “no basis to ask for a certificate” of fire retardancy for the boards, believing the phased approach was sufficient to manage the risk.
This claim was challenged when Dawes presented a slideshow of approximately a dozen site photos. The images clearly showed windows covered with foam boards in plain view—photos that Ku had previously seen in a report. When asked how he could have remained unaware of the boards, Ku stated he had been “focused on the concrete works.” In retrospect, he told the committee he “had been lied to,” but noted he did not follow up because resident complaints had ceased.
The Impact of Systemic Failure
The revelations from the May 5 hearing highlight a critical breakdown in the “three-tier” safety system intended to protect public housing residents. In a standard high-risk renovation, the contractor executes the work, the Registered Inspector (RI) regulates the contractor, and a government body—like the Hong Kong Housing Authority or the Housing Bureau’s ICU—provides an independent check on both.
When the independent checker alerts the regulator, and the regulator alerts the contractor, the system ceases to be a check and balance and instead becomes a coordinated performance. The “self-regulating” nature of the ICU’s oversight meant that risks—such as combustible foam boards and failing scaffolding nets—were not caught by the government, but were instead hidden or ignored until it was too late.
For the residents of Wang Fuk Court, this administrative failure had lethal consequences. The use of non-fire-retardant materials on the exterior of a high-rise building creates a vertical fuel source, allowing a small fire to transform into a massive conflagration in minutes. The admission that the government relied on the “contractor’s word” for safety certificates suggests a dereliction of duty in the ICU’s mandate to protect public safety.
Key Takeaways from the Inquiry
- Advance Warning: 8 out of 10 ICU inspections were announced in advance, allowing contractors to prepare the site.
- Lack of Auditing: The ICU admitted to having no formal auditing system, describing its process as “self-regulating.”
- Material Failures: Scaffolding nets failed initial burn tests (burning for over 10 seconds), yet were reported as compliant to the Buildings Department.
- Verification Gaps: The ICU could not verify the legitimacy of fire retardancy certificates, relying entirely on the contractor’s assertions.
- Ignored Warnings: Despite resident complaints and photographic evidence, senior surveyors claimed they did not notice hazardous foam boards on windows.
The inquiry continues to examine the roles of Will Power Architects and Prestige Construction & Engineering. The committee is expected to scrutinize why a director of the consultancy firm allegedly failed to carry out his duties as a Registered Inspector, and how such a failure went unnoticed by the Housing Bureau for the duration of the project.
The next scheduled session of the independent committee will focus on the contractor’s procurement of materials and the specific chain of command that led to the approval of the non-compliant scaffolding nets. Official updates regarding the hearing schedule and preliminary findings are typically released via the Housing Bureau’s public notices.
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