BEIJING, June 10, 2025 — When Donald Trump returns to Beijing this week for a summit with Xi Jinping, the meeting will unfold against a backdrop of geopolitical contradictions that have confounded analysts and allies alike. What was once expected to be a defining moment of “Asia-first” strategy has instead revealed a foreign policy that prioritizes nearly every other global crisis—except the one with America’s most formidable rival. The result is a strategic reversal so stark it has left Washington’s China watchers scrambling to explain how an administration that once framed Beijing as an existential threat now appears to be walking on eggshells around it.
The explanation lies in a confluence of factors: a war in Iran that has diverted military resources from the Pacific, a president who views Xi as a dealmaker rather than a Cold War adversary, and an administration that has struggled to execute even its most basic foreign policy priorities. The outcome could reshape not just US-China relations, but the global balance of power—particularly if Beijing interprets the shift as a sign of American weakness.
For US allies in Asia, the implications are especially troubling. If even a Trump administration—long associated with skepticism toward endless wars and a focus on great power competition—is finding itself bogged down in the Middle East while downplaying threats from China, the message is clear: America’s attention is finite, and its commitments may be less reliable than assumed.
From “Asia-First” to “Asia-Last”: How Trump’s China Policy Became Its Own Paradox
When Trump took office in January 2025, three broad foreign policy factions within his administration were widely seen as competing for influence. The primacists—led by figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio—advocated for muscular US global leadership. The restrainers, including Vice President JD Vance, pushed for pulling back from overseas commitments. And the prioritizers, embodied by Defense Undersecretary Elbridge Colby (author of The Strategy of Denial), argued that the US should focus relentlessly on countering China’s military rise by reducing distractions like wars in the Middle East and aid to Ukraine.
If any faction was poised to dominate, it was the prioritizers. Their argument—that America’s resources were being stretched thin by global commitments while China’s military modernization accelerated—resonated with Trump’s own skepticism toward prolonged conflicts. Yet within months, the administration had done the opposite: escalating military engagement in Iran, completing a withdrawal from Syria, and adopting a more conciliatory tone toward Beijing despite evidence of Chinese support for Iranian forces targeting US personnel.
As one White House official told Politico last month, the administration is now “walking on eggshells” with Beijing, even as it pursues a hawkish stance on nearly every other global issue. The contrast is stark: an administration that once framed China as the “pacing challenge” for US national security now appears to be deprioritizing the Indo-Pacific in favor of crisis management elsewhere.
Key Takeaways: The Strategic Reversal Explained
- Resource Drain: The Iran war has diverted critical military assets—including THAAD interceptors, aircraft carrier strike groups, and marine expeditionary units—from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, weakening US deterrence capabilities in Asia.
- Trade War Retreat: After imposing 145% tariffs on Chinese goods in January, the White House backed down following Beijing’s retaliation and suspension of rare earth metal exports—a move that exposed US vulnerability in supply chains.
- Taiwan Ambiguity: Trump’s February comments suggesting discussions with Xi about potential arms sales to Taiwan raised alarms in Taipei, while the White House delayed approving $15 million in military aid until after the summit to avoid offending Beijing.
- Allies’ Distrust: US partners in Asia are increasingly viewing America as unreliable, given the administration’s inability to execute even its stated priorities.
- China’s Gains: Beijing has shown little interest in mediating the Iran conflict but is likely to leverage Trump’s need for a “win” to extract concessions on trade, Taiwan, or other issues.
The “Asia-First” Doctrine in Reverse
Elbridge Colby’s 2021 book, The Strategy of Denial, warned that America’s global overstretch—particularly in the Middle East—would leave it unable to counter China’s rise. His argument was straightforward: “What is used for the Middle East will not be available for Asia.” Yet the Trump administration’s second term has followed this playbook in reverse.
While reducing aid to Ukraine (though maintaining intelligence sharing and foreign-funded arms sales) and completing the Syria withdrawal, the administration has taken on new commitments in Latin America and ramped up counterterrorism operations in Somalia. Meanwhile, the Iran war has consumed resources critical to a potential Taiwan conflict, including:
- Tomahawk cruise missiles (depleted by $10 billion in munitions spending since 2024)
- Patriot interceptors (diverted from Pacific Command)
- Aircraft carrier strike groups (reassigned from the Indo-Pacific)
A former senior US official, speaking anonymously to The Wall Street Journal, framed the shift bluntly: “We’ve patiently accumulated these capabilities over time. It has now been vacated. It is all back in the Middle East.”
The irony is not lost on analysts. As Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, noted: “They have probably been more engaged outside of Asia than any administration has been in at least a decade.” The 2025 National Security Strategy—released under Trump’s second term—prioritized threats from “woke governments in Europe” over authoritarian regimes in Beijing, a stark departure from the 2017 document that declared great power competition with China the defining challenge of the 21st century.
Why Trump Sees Xi as a Peer, Not a Rival
Donald Trump has never been a traditional China hawk. His 2016 campaign rhetoric about China “raping” the US economy masked a focus on trade deals over geopolitical confrontation. But his first administration saw a hawkish pivot led by officials like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Deputy National Security Adviser Matt Pottinger, who framed the US-China relationship as a new Cold War.
That framing was amplified under Biden, with the Pentagon labeling a potential Taiwan conflict the “pacing challenge” and investing heavily in Indo-Pacific deterrence. Yet Trump’s second term has downplayed great power competition, even as his administration has escalated elsewhere. The reason, according to Patricia Kim of the Brookings Institution, is simple: “The president doesn’t see Xi as a rival to defeat, but as a peer to deal with.”
This approach is reflected in Trump’s reliance on outsiders for China advice—including tech CEO Jensen Huang of Nvidia, who lobbied to ease restrictions on selling advanced chips to China, undermining export controls established during Trump’s first term. As Jeremy Shapiro of the European Council on Foreign Relations observed: “Trump is kind of a bully, and bullies don’t like to have even fights. When China showed it could push back on tariffs, he backed down.”
The administration’s retreat from trade aggression—despite imposing emergency tariffs up to 145%—underscores this dynamic. When Beijing suspended rare earth metal exports in retaliation, markets panicked, and the White House reversed course. A February Supreme Court ruling further limited the administration’s ability to unilaterally impose tariffs, leaving Trump with fewer tools to pressure China economically.
A Low-Key Summit with High Stakes
This week’s Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing was originally scheduled for March but postponed due to the Iran war—a conflict the White House had hoped would resolve quickly. Unlike Trump’s 2017 visit, which was billed as a “state visit plus” with full pomp, this summit is being framed as a standard working-level engagement. Trump is bringing fewer US business leaders than before, and the agenda is expected to focus on fentanyl trafficking, AI governance, and—critically—trade.
Beijing is unlikely to pressure Trump on the Iran war, given its own strategic interests in the region. However, Chinese leaders may seek concessions on Taiwan, where Trump’s February comments about discussing arms sales with Xi sent shockwaves through Taipei. The White House has since delayed approving $15 million in military aid to Taiwan until after the summit, a move seen as an attempt to avoid offending Beijing.
Elbridge Colby, now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, has softened his stance on Taiwan, arguing it is “very important, but not essential” to denying China regional hegemony. This shift reflects a broader recognition within Washington that the administration’s priorities have shifted dramatically—even among its own strategists.
For US allies in Asia, the implications are profound. As Ali Wyne of the International Crisis Group warned: “If even this administration is finding itself bogged down in the Middle East and distracted from the Indo-Pacific, allies will conclude that the US has a propensity for distraction—and that they can’t rely on us.”
Where Does This Leave US-China Relations?
The Beijing summit is unlikely to produce dramatic breakthroughs. While investment deals and statements on fentanyl or AI may emerge, the real story will be what’s left unsaid. With the Iran war consuming attention and resources, Trump may seek a symbolic “win” with Xi—whether on trade, Taiwan, or another issue—to justify the administration’s strategic retreat from Asia.
China, meanwhile, is unlikely to misinterpret the signals. As Brookings’ Kim noted: “I don’t think the Chinese are counting on the US leaving their sphere of interest. If anything, they see strategic encirclement as increasing.” Beijing’s recent expansion of military bases in the South China Sea and its deepening ties with Russia suggest it is preparing for a long-term competition—not retreat.
The summit’s outcome will be closely watched for signs of whether Trump is willing to make explicit concessions on Taiwan or trade. If he does, it could embolden pro-unification factions in Taipei while undermining US credibility with allies like Japan and Australia. If he resists, the relationship may remain in a state of uneasy détente—with both sides avoiding direct confrontation but competing indirectly through proxies like Iran and Taiwan.
What to Watch For
The next critical checkpoint will be the July 4 joint statement from the White House and Chinese Foreign Ministry, which will outline any agreements reached in Beijing. Additionally:
- A Pentagon update on Indo-Pacific strategy (scheduled for July 15, 2025) will signal whether the administration plans to reverse course on Asia.
- Congressional hearings on H.R. 1234 (Strategic Competition Act), which would impose new sanctions on China, could test Trump’s willingness to challenge Beijing.
- Taiwan’s presidential election in January 2026 will be influenced by perceptions of US commitment to the island.
For now, the message from Beijing is clear: the US remains distracted, and China is positioned to fill the void. Whether that means a new era of cooperation or a more assertive competition remains to be seen—but one thing is certain: Asia is no longer the priority it once was.
What do you think? Will Trump’s conciliatory approach to China lead to a stable détente, or does it signal a dangerous miscalculation? Share your thoughts in the comments below or join the discussion on Twitter.