As U.S. Lawmakers intensify scrutiny of Chinese technology, a bipartisan proposal to restrict federal use of Chinese-made ground robots has emerged as the latest development in an ongoing effort to reduce reliance on Beijing’s supply chains. The American Security Robotics Act, introduced in March 2026 by Senators Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) and Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) alongside Representative Elise Stefanik (R-N.Y.), seeks to limit government procurement of humanoid, canine-style, and crawler robots originating from China. This move follows closely after the Federal Communications Commission’s March 2026 decision to tighten regulations on foreign-made routers, reflecting a broader pattern of tech-focused national security measures targeting specific Chinese imports.
The legislation arrives amid growing concern among policymakers that components and finished products from Chinese manufacturers could pose risks to sensitive government operations. Sociologist Kyle Chan of the Brookings Institute testified before the Congressional Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party on April 16, 2026, characterizing the robot and router restrictions as part of a “long line of growing tech security concerns” in U.S.-China relations. His remarks underscored the bipartisan nature of the initiative, noting that similar scrutiny has persisted across multiple administrations regardless of party control.
Proponents of the bill argue that limiting Chinese ground robots in federal use would strengthen domestic security while potentially benefiting U.S.-based firms like Ghost Robotics, which specializes in quadrupedal robots for defense and industrial applications. Ground robots represent finished products at the higher conclude of the manufacturing value chain, distinct from components like semiconductors that serve as building blocks for other technologies. Analysts note that if restrictions were extended to include Chinese-made parts used in American-assembled robots, it could complicate supply chains for domestic manufacturers who currently rely on both Chinese competitors and suppliers.
The robotics industry in the United States remains in an early stage of development, with adoption levels still limited and supplier networks not yet fully matured. Experts suggest that countries such as South Korea and Japan—viewed as friendly partners by Washington—could potentially fill gaps if Chinese components are deemed insecure. However, for certain technologies like uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), Chinese dominance extends throughout the entire production chain, making substitution more difficult. The U.S. Department of Commerce has pursued restrictions on Chinese drones for over a year, and in December 2025, the FCC added specific UAS models and components to its Covered List of banned equipment, a list that includes products from major manufacturers such as DJI.
Critics of the current approach warn that abrupt bans without corresponding investments in domestic capacity could disrupt industries unprepared for rapid shifts. Kyle Chan pointed to the drone ban as an example where a “sharp and fast switch” left manufacturers scrambling, arguing that a more gradual transition—ramping up U.S. Production while tapering dependence on Chinese imports—would have been less disruptive. Similarly, Stephen Ezell of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation observed that the United States lacks a “serious, overarching strategy” to guide its response to U.S.-China technological competition, describing the current sequence of actions as reactive rather than coordinated.
The FCC’s router ban, which took effect in March 2026, illustrates how supply chain dynamics are already shifting in some sectors. Despite the regulation, data from the Global Electronics Association shows that in 2025, China accounted for only 1.1% of the value of routers imported into the United States, down from approximately 20.5% in 2019. Instead, Vietnam, Mexico, and Thailand collectively supplied 68.4% of U.S. Router imports by value that year, indicating that diversification had already begun prior to the rule change. Shawn DuBravac, an economist with the Global Electronics Association, emphasized that while the ban targets foreign-made hardware, the most common security risks often stem from unpatched software, default passwords, and outdated firmware rather than the country of origin alone.
In April 2026, the FCC granted conditional approvals for certain routers from Netgear and Adtran, as well as UAS models from Sees.ai, allowing their distribution in the United States under specific terms. Netgear, headquartered in the United States, manufactures its routers in Vietnam and Taiwan, according to Consumer Reports. DuBravac noted that the three-week timeline for issuing these exemptions suggests a degree of flexibility in the process, though the 18-month duration of the approvals creates uncertainty for long-term planning. He stressed that companies now face heightened expectations to trace not only their direct suppliers but also the sources of those suppliers’ components—a level of scrutiny previously uncommon in routine regulatory adjustments.
The procedural speed of recent tech restrictions has also drawn attention. Unlike standard FCC rulemaking, which typically includes public notice and comment periods, the determinations regarding UAS and routers were made through a White House interagency task force that bypassed conventional outreach. Chan observed that there has been “not much of a back and forth process” into the UAS rule, while DuBravac contrasted this with typical electronics industry engagements, where investigations usually allow stakeholder input to shape outcomes. He argued that such dialogue fosters a sense of collaboration, whereas the current approach feels unilateral to many in the sector.
As the debate over Chinese technology continues, the American Security Robotics Act remains under consideration in Congress. No vote has been scheduled as of April 24, 2026, and the bill’s text has not been amended since its introduction. Stakeholders seeking updates can monitor the official websites of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs or the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, where related legislation is typically reviewed. For real-time tracking of federal procurement policies, the General Services Administration’s public notices and the System for Award Management (SAM.gov) provide authoritative sources on contracting restrictions and eligibility.
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