The Contested, Not collapsing, Liberal International Order: Beyond the Specter of a New Illiberal System
For decades, non-liberal regimes have engaged in deliberate diplomatic, military, and ideological cooperation, honing strategies for regime survival and internal security through mutual learning and support. What distinguishes the present era isn’t the existence of this cooperation, but its amplified visibility, facilitated by technology and operating within a more interconnected and institutionalized global landscape. This has lead to a surge in normative contestation within international institutions - a collision of competing visions of sovereignty, democracy, and human rights – but to characterize this as the emergence of a rival order is a misdiagnosis. It’s a manifestation of the inherently political nature of institutions, a point long recognized by institutionalist scholarship.
the assertion that we are witnessing the rise of a coherent illiberal international order is not only premature, but actively obscures the core issue: the erosion of liberal commitment within the existing order. International institutions are not neutral arbiters; they are arenas shaped by power dynamics, shifting coalitions, and varying normative commitments. Illiberal actors contesting liberal norms within these spaces isn’t evidence of institutional failure, but rather of institutional politics functioning as intended. The more pressing concern lies wiht the inconsistent behavior of liberal democracies themselves – the selective enforcement of norms, and the prioritization of short-term strategic gains over long-term normative objectives. This ambivalence creates the space for contestation, not as of illiberal strength, but because of liberal weakness.
Focusing solely on authoritarian coordination risks displacing responsibility and deflecting attention from the role liberal democracies have played in undermining the normative foundations of the international order. A selective, often instrumentalist, approach to human rights and institutional principles has eroded the credibility of liberal leadership, fostering an environment where option interpretations of sovereignty can gain traction. This isn’t a call to abandon liberal institutionalism,but to revise it. Institutions remain vital, cooperation remains potent, and rules continue to shape behavior. however, the assumption that mere participation in these institutions will automatically safeguard liberal norms in the absence of sustained political will is demonstrably false. Normative convergence isn’t a product of institutional design,but of power,persuasion,and unwavering commitment – factors that are inherently contextual.
A crucial step forward is reintegrating a robust understanding of power - encompassing material, discursive, and normative dimensions – into our analysis of international institutions. Authoritarian regimes aren’t simply bulldozing over established norms; they are adept at exploiting ambiguities, leveraging procedural rules, and forging issue-specific coalitions. Critically, their success in doing so is contingent on the actions – and inactions – of others. Institutional outcomes remain fundamentally political. The current situation isn’t a systemic transformation towards a unified illiberal alternative, but a period of heightened contestation characterized by fragmentation, selective cooperation, and normative ambiguity. Over-interpreting episodic alignment between authoritarian states as evidence of systemic change is a risky overreach.
international orders rarely succumb to sudden, dramatic collapses. Rather, they unravel gradually through a process of normalized compromises and the slow hollowing out of shared commitments. this process will be determined not solely by the actions of illiberal actors, but by the complex interplay between contestation and accommodation within existing institutions. Framing this dynamic primarily as the rise of an illiberal international order conflates a symptom with the underlying structure. The constraints we face are not inherent flaws in liberal institutionalism as a theory, but rather deficiencies in liberal political practice.
Institutions can facilitate cooperation and provide a platform for contestation, but they cannot substitute for genuine normative commitment. recognizing this distinction allows for a more nuanced and accurate assessment of the challenges facing global governance in an era of visible, yet far from unified, authoritarian cooperation. The task before us isn’t to lament the supposed demise of the liberal order, but to revitalize the political will necessary to defend and strengthen its core principles – not through institutional tinkering alone, but through consistent action, principled leadership, and a renewed commitment to the values that underpin a just and stable international system.
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