Interstate rivalries survive major shocks when the resulting strategic conditions fall within a “stability range,” a state where the costs of ending the rivalry exceed the costs of maintaining it. According to international relations theory, these rivalries only transform when a “tipping point” occurs—a systemic shift, such as total regime collapse or a decisive power imbalance, that renders the existing hostility unsustainable.
The persistence of long-term state competition often defies conventional logic, which suggests that catastrophic events like wars should force a resolution. However, geopolitical data indicates that shocks frequently reinforce existing tensions by validating the perceived threats each side feels. This cycle creates a self-sustaining equilibrium where hostility becomes a primary tool of national identity and domestic political legitimacy.
Strategic stability ranges function as a buffer that absorbs shocks. When a conflict or economic crisis occurs, if the outcome does not fundamentally alter the power distribution or the core goals of the rival states, the rivalry persists. In many cases, the shock serves as a “reinforcing event,” deepening the mistrust and increasing the investment in military deterrence.
How Stability Ranges Prevent Conflict Resolution
A stability range is maintained when neither side believes it can achieve a decisive victory or that the other side is willing to concede. This often manifests as the “security dilemma,” a term used in international relations to describe how actions taken by one state to increase its own security are perceived as threats by its rival, leading to an escalatory spiral. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, this dynamic is evident in the ongoing strategic competition between the United States and China, where trade restrictions and military expansions are framed as defensive measures but viewed as offensive by the opposing side.
The India-Pakistan rivalry provides a primary example of a rivalry that survives repeated shocks. Since the 1947 partition, the two nations have fought multiple wars, including major conflicts in 1965, 1971, and the 1999 Kargil conflict. Each of these shocks failed to reach a tipping point because the fundamental dispute over Kashmir and the underlying ideological differences remained unresolved. Instead of ending the rivalry, these wars reinforced the necessity of military readiness and the internal political utility of the “external enemy.”
In these scenarios, the “shock” does not break the system; it resets the baseline for what is considered normal tension. The rivalry enters a new phase of the stability range where both parties accept a high level of hostility as the status quo. This prevents the transition to peace because any move toward reconciliation is viewed as a strategic vulnerability that the rival could exploit.
Identifying the Tipping Points of Transformation
A tipping point occurs when a shock is sufficiently massive to push the relationship outside its stability range, forcing a structural transformation. This typically happens through three mechanisms: total exhaustion, asymmetric collapse, or a fundamental shift in the perceived identity of the states.
The end of the Cold War serves as the clearest example of an asymmetric collapse. The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union persisted for decades despite nuclear brinkmanship and proxy wars. The tipping point was not a military defeat in a traditional war, but the internal economic and political collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This shock was so systemic that the Soviet state could no longer sustain the costs of the rivalry, leading to the abrupt dissolution of the bipolar world order.
Contrast this with the resolution of the Franco-German rivalry. For centuries, France and Germany were locked in a cycle of conflict, culminating in the devastation of World War I and World War II. The tipping point arrived after 1945, not just through military defeat, but through the creation of new institutional frameworks. The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951—the precursor to the European Union—intentionally linked the two economies so tightly that the cost of renewing the rivalry became prohibitively high. This shifted the stability range from one of hostility to one of interdependence.
The Role of Power Asymmetry and Deterrence
Power asymmetry can either stabilize a rivalry or accelerate it toward a tipping point. When one state holds an overwhelming advantage, the rivalry may enter a “frozen” state where the weaker party cannot challenge the stronger, but the stronger party finds the cost of total absorption too high. This is currently observed in the relationship between North Korea and South Korea.
The Korean Peninsula has remained in a state of technical war since 1953. According to reports from the United Nations, the rivalry survives because the strategic shocks—such as North Korea’s nuclear tests or South Korea’s economic rise—have not reached a tipping point that forces a change in regime or a unification agreement. The stability range is maintained through deterrence; the threat of mutually assured destruction or catastrophic urban warfare prevents either side from attempting a decisive resolution.
Strategic shocks can also act as catalysts for “re-stabilization.” For example, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) attempted to move the Iran-U.S. rivalry into a new stability range based on nuclear monitoring. However, the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 acted as a counter-shock, pushing the rivalry back into a range of heightened tension and sanctions, demonstrating that tipping points can move in both directions.
Why Modern Rivalries Are Harder to Break
Modern interstate rivalries are increasingly influenced by non-state actors, global economic integration, and information warfare, which complicate the identification of tipping points. In the past, a rivalry often ended with a signed treaty or a fallen capital. Today, “grey zone” warfare—which includes cyberattacks and economic coercion—allows states to apply pressure without triggering a traditional military shock that would lead to a tipping point.
The integration of global supply chains creates a paradox. While interdependence was once thought to prevent rivalry, it is now being used as a weapon. “Weaponized interdependence” occurs when a state uses its control over a critical node in the global economy to coerce a rival. This creates a new kind of stability range where states are too economically linked to go to war, but too strategically opposed to find peace.
This current environment suggests that many 21st-century rivalries may avoid tipping points for longer periods. Because shocks are distributed across economic, digital, and political spheres rather than concentrated in a single military event, the “stability range” of hostility is expanding. States can now sustain high levels of competition without reaching the threshold of total collapse or total resolution.
The next significant indicator of a shift in these global rivalries will be the upcoming reports on strategic stability and arms control from the 2025 international security summits, where the viability of current deterrence frameworks will be reassessed. Readers can follow official updates via the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs.
Do you believe economic interdependence prevents war or provides new tools for rivalry? Share your perspective in the comments below.